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Abstract
Sino-Africa relations has become a topic of immense interest within the field of
international relations. In particular, China’s use of “soft power” in order to support its
peaceful rise in the international arena. Originally coined by American political scientist
Joseph Nye (1990) the term “soft power” is the ability for a state to get what it wants
without threat or coercion. The application of a Western theory by the PRC is worthy of
further study and analysis. Recent scholarship within Chinese and Western academic
circles have looked more closely at China’s soft power utility and how it promotes Nye’s
pillars of soft power (culture, political values, and foreign policies). Specifically, where
China’s soft power practices are in line with Nye’s (1990) original theory and where it
deviates. This thesis will look at how China has built its soft power in Africa and how
China utilizes that power. Furthermore, this thesis examines the question of whether
China receives greater political support in the United Nations General Assembly from
Africa governments with which it has close aid, investment, and trade relationships.
Using descriptive statistics and correlation models, this study finds that although China’s
relationship with Africa grows exponentially this does not necessarily produce more soft
power efficacy for China.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Globalization has made the world more open to international integration through
trade, capital flows, cross-cultural exchange, and the spread of norms. One idea that has
become universally discussed is the concept of “soft power.” Joseph S. Nye (1990)
identified “three main sources” of soft power to explain the shifting political
environment. . These non-exclusive sources are “culture, political values, and foreign
policies” (166-167) as an alternative to “hard power” which relies on “coercion and
threats…soft power applies attraction in order to get what you want” (Nye, 1990, 166). A
state’s soft power stems from the “attractiveness of its specific culture, political values,
and foreign policies” to other states that wish to emulate its example (Nye, 2004, 6-7). In
addition, soft power will be enhanced if domestic and foreign policies are perceived as
legitimate. China, as an emerging power, has been utilizing its soft power resources in
Africa. Soft power allows for better cross-cultural relationships between states, and it also
enhances the legitimacy of a state’s governing regime. For China, this is an important
attribute of soft power because China’s economic policies serve “as an alternative to
western models of economic development” (Zhao, 2010, 436).
The concept of soft power with “Chinese characteristics” should be further
analyzed due to its growing importance in world politics (Glaser and Murphy, 10, 2009).
In particular, Chinese use of broad range of economic incentives to African states.
According to Glaser and Murphy (2009), “the Chinese also do not use the same
categories of aid or Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) as the OECD” (857).
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Therefore, Chinese aid figures are perceived as convoluted due to “secrecy,” lack of
transparency, and variations in what “aid” really is results in “miscalculation”
(Brautigam, 2009, 167-168). Although soft power is a western concept, there is a
growing amount of Chinese scholarship that embraces the theory in order to analyze and
explain Chinese foreign policy. Within the past few decades, there has been a shift in soft
power sources due to its implementation by non-Western states. In particular, China’s use
of soft power has been under more critical review due to its competing interests in Africa
with other actors, namely the United States. Consequently, Chinese influence may reduce
the ability of outside competition and potential political and economic power of actors
such as the United States.
Over several decades, Africa, in particular, has continued to be an important part
of Chinese foreign policy. There is a difference of opinions across the political spectrum
that believe that the Chinese have only exploitive intentions in Africa or claim that China
is trying to challenge U.S. hegemony(Chan, 2013). Other opinions claim that China treats
Africa as an equal partner and China only has peaceful intentions (Bodomo: 2009;
Mazimhaka: 2013). Regardless of opinions, the Chinese approach to soft power in order
to foster and cultivate diplomatic relationships is unique and therefore worthy of closer
study. The issue is particularly important because China, in contrast to previous colonial
and post-colonial powers, condemns any meddling in a country’s internal affairs. In
addition, Chinese aid and development are offered without expectations of domestic
political reform. Furthermore, China is perceived as an attractive ally be
Like many of the governments in Africa that China is engaged with, its reputation
is burdened with problems such as its human rights record. China works diligently to
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promote itself as a non-interventionist state that only aims to rise peacefully. In addition,
China solicits Africa’s support for its “One China” policy regarding Taiwan. African
states exhibit support in multilateral forums such as the United Nations. China has
invested enormous energy and financial resources to end African countries’ diplomatic
recognition of Taipei (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012, 10). China’s status as a veto holder on
the UN Security Council allows China to exert influence and seek to establish credibility
both domestically and internationally. This thesis examines the question of whether
China received greater political support in the United Nations General Assembly from
Africa governments with which it has close aid, investment, and trade relationships.
Globalization has created a more competitive world where states vie for material
gain and access to resources. The thesis aims to provide insight into China’s use of soft
power in Africa. Specifically, whether the use of aid and investment results in voting
alignment with China in the United Nations General Assembly. This thesis will look at
how China has built its soft power in Africa and how China utilizes that power. The
primary focus is China’s foreign policy and how it courts developing states in Africa and
what China expects to gain from these diplomatic and economic partnerships.
The basic structure of this thesis is as follows: Chapter Two will discuss in more
detail Nye’s concept of soft power and how Chinese foreign policy coincides and
deviates from its definition. Chinese soft power differs from the Western approach, and
this chapter will look more closely at the discussion of soft power within Chinese
strategic and academic circles. In particular, the chapter explores how the Chinese
interpret “culture, political values, and foreign policy” as soft power resources (Nye,
2004, 6-7). A Chinese perspective on soft power is imperative to understanding how
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Beijing sets goals, creates plans, and utilizes its soft power in the United Nations General
Assembly.
Chapter Three will provide a qualitative discussion of what China seeks to gain
from this engagement. In addition, the chapter will examine how China achieves these
goals, observing China’s soft power strategies and tools of influence. This chapter will
discuss China’s relationships with African states and the benefit it provides China
economically and politically. Economically, China focuses resources in Africa in order to
complement its own growing economy. China bases these relationships on reciprocity,
mutual benefit, and respect for state sovereignty. However, there are political
expectations to an economic partnership with the PRC. Namely, adherence to its “One
China” policy, marginalizing Taiwan, and insulating China from criticism of its human
rights. In addition, this chapter will explore how China has strategically utilized Africa as
a voting bloc in the United Nations General Assembly.
Against the backdrop of the qualitative analysis of previous chapters, Chapter
Four will present descriptive statistics to assess the effects of China's soft power in
Africa. Several variables such as trade, foreign aid, gross domestic product, voting
alignment in the United Nations General Assembly, and political terrorism scores are
include in the data set. In addition, this chapter will provide several graphs in order to
showcase the relationship between China and Africa. In addition, this chapter will house
the research and methods section in order to explain the graphs and tables in order to
present the data collected. The chapter will include a brief summary of previous research
around foreign aid and political alignment and the role it plays in the United Nations
General Assembly. A discussion of the variables used and why they are significant in
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attempting to measure something intangible like soft power. Lastly, the chapter will
discuss the challenges to measuring China’s soft power.
The final chapter will discuss the entire thesis and its contribution to the study of
Sino-African relations. In addition, the conclusion will discuss the importance of the
United Nations’ reputation, and how its soft power is susceptible to changing political
events. It will further discuss how governments should not ignore soft power resources
and that China faces challenges with its soft power development; bridging the gap
between its foreign and domestic policies. The chapter will conclude with suggestions for
future research.
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Chapter 2
Soft Power Literature Review

Power is a broad concept that is continually analyzed, critiqued, and
conceptualized within the study of international relations. In his analysis of “political
discourse”, Connolly (1974) expressed the view that the term “power” is an essentially
contested concept, and its definition is dependent on the audience. Once there is a mutual
understanding between both sides of the debate then political discussions about power
can be "enlightened" (40). Heng (2010) comments that soft power with Chinese
characteristics has created more confusion than clarity (277). Ogoura (2006) claims that
soft power creates "conceptual confusion" and further explains that soft power can be
"distorted, misused and in some cases abused" (48-50). Blanchard and Lu (2012) also
suggest that "soft power" is a term that is used too "loosely" (566). The aim of this review
is to discuss Nye’s concept of “soft power” and provide a better understanding of how
Chinese scholarship interprets “soft power” as a theory and a tool of international
relations.
Soft Power Theory
“Cultural soft power has two main purposes: one is to enhance national cohesions
and creativity and meet the demands of the people. The other purpose is to strengthen
China’s competitiveness in the contest for comprehensive national power in the
international arena.”
Former Chinese President Hu Jintao (quoted in Li, 2008, 296)
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“A country's soft power”, according to Nye (2011), “rests on three resources”
(84). First is culture and whether a state is perceived as attractive to other states. Second,
a state’s commitment to political values at home and abroad. Lastly, the perception that a
state’s foreign policies are legitimate and moral (84-85). China's emphasis and focus on
soft power building through culture, political values, foreign policy, and institutions
complies to some extent with Nye's analysis (Heng, 2010, 282). Scholarship and debate
around Chinese soft power seem to view it as coinciding with Nye's framework. There is
evidence of a consensus around the importance of culture, political values, and foreign
policy (Heng, 2010; Hackbarth, 2008; Li 2008; Siow, 2010).
Nye (2004) describes that a powerful state can influence the “behavior of others”
because they can, "coerce them with threats," "induce them with payments," or “attract or
co-opt them” (1). Nye observes, "Military force remains the ultimate form of power in a
self-help system, the use of force has become more costly for modern forces than it was
before” (Hackbarth, 2008, 21). In order to promote its “peaceful rise”, China seeks to
develop its relationships offering attractive incentives such as economic aid,
development, and as a non-Western ally. China has focused on alignment and building
relationships with the Global South in distinctive ways. In contrast to other soft power
wielders such as the United States, China offers a relationship that doesn’t expect
political reform. Applying an innovative approach, a relationship with China provides
developing countries to the ability to develop economically and still retain their
individual sovereignty (Mazimhaka, 2013, 94).
Mingjiang (2008) describes that Chinese soft power plays an intricate part in
China's foreign policy. However, it is “insufficiently understood in the outside world”
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(287). Blanchard and Lu's (2012) argument is soft power should be considered in terms
of "form, target and context" (566). Gill and Huang (2006), Kurlantzick (2006), and
Blanchard and Lu (2012) believe that soft power in the form of economic goods or
payments can be confusing. The confusion comes from the suspicion that Chinese aid,
grants, loans, and debt relief are not funneled through soft power channels. The receiver
of such payments may just consider it a bribe. In some cases, China is the only ally to
pariah states. The economic relief China offers can be perceived as an enabling
mechanism to keep these authoritarian regimes in power.
Siow (2010) describes soft power as a Western concept that has only recently
found acceptance within Chinese policy-making circles (1). Broadly speaking Siow
(2010) confirms that Chinese analysts agree with Nye's definition of soft power. The
importance of Chinese thought in the soft power debate should be included. Changping
(2007) finds that Chinese analysts desire to be a part of the discourse and have their
voices heard. Chinese conceptions offer a non-western perspective to the debate and can
describe China's ideology, culture, and society from non-bias (301). Kang (2008)
discusses that Nye’s theory of soft power is American-centric but it can be applied to
other states and people. For China, this is particularly true because China openly
acknowledges soft power as an important component of its domestic and foreign policy
objectives.
China has applied its own characteristics to Nye’s soft power theory. Kurlantzick
(2007) describes Chinese soft power as a “charm offensive” (1). Furthermore, Chinese
transcend the original concept of soft power to include "anything outside of the military
and security realm” (Kurlantzick, 2007, 6). Heng (2010) explains that the Chinese soft
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power definition should add economic development, diplomatic cooperation, and
investment agreements that were formerly excluded by Nye (282). Cao describes Chinese
soft power as “soft appeal” and deviates from Nye’s (2004) theory of soft power (Chan,
2013, 65). Cao elaborates and describes “soft appeal” as a better term to describe China’s
particular relationship with Africa. Soft appeal’s goal is that its strength lies in the “moral
argument” and the “right moral standing” in the relationship between states (65).
Mingjiang (2008) explains in order to understand China's utilization of soft power
fully then the perspectives of Chinese scholars must be included within the debate (1).
For the Chinese, soft power is an essential element of leadership. The power of attraction,
framing the issues and agenda setting are considered key elements of influence and
diplomacy (Hackbarth, 2008, 117). However, Blanchard and Lu (2012) argue that part of
the "attraction" that African states have for China is because, for countries like Sudan,
China is the only alternative (569).
Mingjiang (2008) describes that the Chinese interpret and understand the concept
of soft power in many ways that coincide with Nye's analysis (288). However, there are
distinctive features where China deviates. An important aspect in analyzing soft power
with Chinese characteristics is the importance of the mass media (Li, 2008, 294). In an
additional departure from Nye's theory, Chinese scholarship emphasizes that hard and
soft power are inseparable (Mingjiang, 2008, 9).
Nye (2004) explains, “that a state may obtain the outcomes it wants in world
politics because other states will admire its values, emulate its example and aspire to its
level of prosperity” (5). Furthermore, “when a state’s culture includes universal values, it
increases the probability of it obtaining its desired outcomes through attraction” (Nye,
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2004, 31). However, Chan (2013) points out that that in Sino-African case, Western
“universal values” such as “liberty, democracy, and human rights have been replaced
with Confucian values” (53). Confucian values outlined by Chan include brotherhood,
benevolence, harmony, loyalty, and reciprocation (53). Therefore, qualities of Nye’s soft
power have integrated with Chinese foreign policy objectives in order to influence states
in Africa politically.
Chinese discourse moves beyond Nye's original theory because it attaches great
importance to the mass media. Mingjiang (2008) explains that for China, effective mass
communications help with soft power cultivation. Within China there is a perception that
western media has monopolized mass communications and extends Western "cultural
hegemony" to the world (8). China is determined to counter Western dominated media by
developing and strengthening its own international communications (20-22). However,
Mingjiang (2008) astutely points out that the media may be a tool to cultivate soft power,
or the Chinese government could leave itself more vulnerable to international criticism.
The Chinese media will be reliant on the PRC government and its media coverage is
automatically assumed to be biased. In stark contrast to Western media sources that
exercise more independence and have shown to be critical of their governments (22).
Heng (2010) discusses the distinctive soft power strategies that are taken by
China, brings both advantages and weaknesses. One disadvantage is that China is always
grappling with its image due to vague domestic and foreign policies. Mingjiang (2008)
finds that there is a mainstream belief that Chinese soft power is underdeveloped due to
various issues surrounding strategic planning (22). Shambaugh (2011) claims that China
lacks an international identity (9). In the author's analysis of soft power in Chinese
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international relations, there are "seven" unique perspectives that rest on a political
spectrum (9). On one side, there are Chinese scholars that advocate for isolationism and
on the opposite end those that support full engagement in international affairs and
institutions (9). In addition, Mingjiang's (2008) analysis, he finds that the concept of "soft
power" is not necessarily embraced by everyone in China. Veteran diplomat Sha Zukang,
describes the term soft power "condescending" and "created by western countries," does
provide an opposing opinion in whether soft power is embraced by the Chinese (658).
Despite this difference of opinions, Mingjiang (2008) affirms that for the Chinese
“soft power is a means to multiple ends” (299). Chinese officials understand that soft
power does not grow at the same rate as hard power or with economic progress. Soft
power develops only through careful nurturing of relations abroad (Siow, 2010, 2). Ding
(2008) writes that Beijing understands the importance of establishing international norms
through soft power (193). Consistent with Nye's (1990) framework, China seeks to
promote its culture and political values through international institutions and diplomacy
to ensure it is less likely to conform to Western expectations (153).
The concept of soft power is a broad concept which therefore allows a lot of room
for political maneuvering and interpretation. For the Chinese, soft power rests on
“attraction” and developing relationships that are based on mutual benefit and reciprocity.
The literature claims that China does not approach relationships with a threat of force or
through coercive measures. However, China’s use of soft power to cultivate economic
relationships could eventually place China in a hard power position and lead it to
leverage its military and economic strength over a weaker state.
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Research and scholarly discussion on China’s utilization of soft power are based
on China’s larger strategy to ensure its economic and political objectives are met. China
has no interest in military conflict because it would hinder its development process.
Therefore, soft power is an important tool that will allow China to present a positive
image to the world, counter foreign misrepresentations about China, and safeguard the
existing regime.

Culture
"In today's world, culture intertwines with economics and politics, demonstrating
a more prominent position and role in the competition for comprehensive national power"
-Former President of the People's Republic of China (1993–2003), Jiang Zemin

Culture matters and is an important component in the discussion of China’s soft
power (Nye, 2004; Chan, 2013). Critiques given by Chinese academics argue that China
cannot compete internationally without building up its soft power resources (Mingjiang,
2008, 290). Wang and Lu (2008) explain that China deviates from Nye’s framework that
emphasizes modern American popular culture, because alternatively China promotes its
traditional culture (431). Chinese scholarship expands Nye’s original theory. In
particular, the importance of culture and cites domestic conditions to help explain
Chinese conceptions of soft power (Li, 2008, 288-296). In the form of soft power,
cultures matter in international relations because there are more emerging powers
competing for resources and influence.
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An important element of Chinese culture is that it possesses a long civilization
with a historic past. This history includes victimization from foreign occupations. China
and Africa share a history of Western exploitation. China utilizes past mistreatment as a
reason for its current foreign and domestic policies (Heng, 2010, 296). Liu (2013)
explains that the incorporation of culture into international relations brings “new
interpretations of the state’s diplomatic strategies based on cultural norms and values”
(Chan, 2013, 58). For China, this is especially true because it sees itself more of a fitting
partner with other states in the global South. Despite obvious barriers such as language,
China still shares many of the same struggles as African states because it views itself as a
developing country.
Ding (2008) points out that when scholarship examines Chinese soft power it
often overlooks moral attraction, which is a fundamental element of soft power (28).
China emphasizes equality, mutual benefit, and respect for the sovereignty of the host
state (Chan, 2013, 23). Chinese soft power is considered attractive to African countries
because China claims the moral high ground over previous colonial powers. The Chinese
commentary that explains Chinese conceptions of soft power incorporates values that are
rooted in Chinese philosophy. Beyond Confucianism, Chinese incorporate soft power
features that are found in Taoism and Buddhism. Values include "peace and harmony,"
"benevolent governance," "respect through virtue," and "harmony without suppressing
differences" (Mingjiang, 2008; Liu, 2013). These Chinese cultural values are considered
soft power resources because concepts such as "harmony" can transcend national borders
and are universally appealing.
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Chinese scholarship explains that Western civilization is based on individualism
and materialism that helped the West industrialize (Mingjiang, 2008, 291). However, it
caused social and ethical problems that later produced conflicts domestically and
internationally. Chinese culture and soft power support a "peaceful rise" and an
alternative to western emulation (292). However, the Chinese government is hesitant to
fully promote a "China model" because it prefers to be considered a developing country.
According to Ding (2008), although Nye developed the term "soft power" the
concept of "attraction” pre-existed within traditional Chinese culture and philosophy
(195). Ding cites Sun Zi's strategic resources, which are "people's rationality, morality,
values and aspirations (197). China promotes its culture, which translates into policy as
non-interfering, fair, and moral. For this reason, China is considered attractive to states
that have felt ostracized by outside powers, such as the United States.
China bases its cultural diplomacy on history and traditions. However, this could
become problematic. Yu Xintian (2007) warns that China should be wary of
overemphasizing its traditional culture (35). In addition Mingjiang (2008), claims that
placing too much emphasis on Chinese culture in order to promote soft power resources
abroad may be "misleading" and do damage to China's image (7). This is due to the
revolutionary experience of the Chinese Communist Party under Mao Zedong and the
Cultural Revolution (Yu Xintian, 2007, 36). During the Cultural Revolution, there was
mass destruction of anything that symbolized customs, culture, habits, and traditional
ideas. Presently, the Chinese Communist Party emphasizes cultural traditions that were
once considered negative elements of the state. This could be perceived as confusing
because an emphasis on the past excluded Chinese ethnic minorities and regarded as
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“backward” (Mingjiang, 2008, 7). Therefore, Chinese culture should complement foreign
policy objectives of non-interference and respecting state sovereignty.
There is a consensus that the successful increase of soft power abroad will help
strengthen existing Chinese cultural identity and enhance domestic, national pride (Siow,
2010, 2). In the world, there exists a widespread interest in Chinese culture. Centuries of
Chinese migration have contributed to a global embrace of Chinese cuisine, music,
cinema, traditional medicine and martial arts. Furthermore, the amount of people around
the world learning Mandarin Chinese continues to grow. However, the growth does not
necessarily imply increased Chinese soft power because there is debate over whether
people desire to learn the language, sees its benefit for business or both (Paradise, 2009,
644).
Regardless, of the reasons non-Chinese people wish to learn Mandarin, the
Chinese government has focused considerable attention in language and culture
exchange. This investment has manifested in the establishment of Confucius Institutes all
over the world. According to Paradise (2009), Confucius Institutes were established to
promote and support China's "good will" agenda (650). Chinese universities, in
particular, benefit substantially from academic exchanges and partnerships with foreign
universities (Paradise, 2009, 652). In addition, to Confucius Institutes China admits
thousands of international students to its universities in order to promote cross-cultural
and educational exchange.
Bodomo (2009), shares the Chinese sentiment that cultural exchange through
education promotes peace. Bodomo writes that Confucius Institutes provide an
opportunity to build stronger relations with Africa. It is unfair to claim that China's only
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concern is Africa's natural resources, such as oil. Confucius Institutes have the capacity to
help ordinary Africans have educational opportunities and develop their communities.
Furthermore, these institutes can foster better cultural understanding between China and
African states (173-174). As of 2014, China operates 38 Confucius Institutes in Africa,
stretching from Cape Town to Cairo.
Paradise (2009) conducted extensive research on the perception of Confucius
Institutes as a tool to increase Chinese soft power. Paradise found that many Chinese
academics claimed the notion was the "wrong idea" and "misleading" (657). Paradise also
refers to the growing fear and suspicions that Confucius Institutes are a "Trojan Horse"
and are a vehicle to support China's growing influence and propaganda. The "Trojan
Horse" theory is further perpetuated because the Chinese government funds these
institutes, and there may be "strings" attached to accepting funds (Paradise, 2009, 662).
However, Chinese scholarship often refutes such doubts and claim that Confucius
Institutes are a harmonious component of China's peaceful development and desire to
share its culture with the world (Paradise, 2009).
Adding more to the debate around the Confucius Institutes is whether they are
used as tool to push particular Chinese policies. Gill and Huang (2006) claim that
Confucius Institutes have a “political agenda” because they were established to present
China as non-threatening through education (18). There still exists concerns over whether
Confucius Institutes are non-political because it is perceived that these institutes further
perpetuate the Chinese foreign policy of marginalizing Taiwan. Each Confucius Institute
incorporates the unique characteristics of every region. However, these institutes all share
a commitment to the promotion of Chinese culture and language (Paradise, 2009, 648).
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Therefore, students at Confucius Institutes learn to speak Mandarin Chinese and learn
from books and resources that are consistent with Beijing's message (Gill & Huang,
2006, 18). Concerns over direct funding from the Chinese government, intellectual
freedom, and censorship prompted Confucius Institutes to close at Stockholm University,
the University of Chicago, and Pennsylvania State University in 2014. Whether these
concerns are warranted is still a matter of debate.
Confucius Institutes may be targets of unfair criticism because of China’s
growing influence. However, as Paradise (2009) astutely points out, since Confucius
Institutes are a soft power activity, the project is dependent on the attractiveness of
Chinese culture abroad (662). The institutes’ survival is dependent on China’s ability to
work with host countries and provide a legitimate educational environment for students.
Although, there may be propaganda woven into the curriculum there is an advantage to
students who wish to learn Mandarin and understand the Chinese culture.
Beyond state funded Confucius Institutes abroad, the Chinese government invests
substantial funds in order to promote Chinese culture. The Chinese government has direct
involvement in international cultural exhibitions around the world. Examples of these
include the display of terracotta army statues, antiques, and concerts (Paradise, 2009,
649). China projects its soft power through education not only with Confucius Institutes
but also establishing, advertising and circulating of English and Chinese scholarly
journals (Blanchard & Lu, 2012, 573). Although not all of China’s attempts at cultural
and educational exchange are embraced by the Western world, their growing influence
and presence are impossible to ignore.
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Political Values
Chinese political values are closely linked to its cultural principles. Chinese soft
power resources include distinctive cultural and ideological attractiveness, norms and
rules (Fijalkowski, 2011, 224). China emphasizes that its diplomatic relationships are
based on equality, mutual benefit, and non-interference (Chan, 2013, 23). Chinese
discussion surrounding political values incorporates an agenda that supports a domestic
purpose (Mingjiang, 2008, 2).
Chinese scholarship develops an alternative to Nye's emphasis on political values.
According to Wang and Lu (2008) Chinese discourse favors the "attractiveness" of the
Chinese economy and considers economic development as a political value (431).
Fijalkowski (2011) explains that a thriving economy is a source of attraction and provides
legitimacy to the Chinese government both domestically and internationally (224).
The political value of equality is a source of soft power for China within Africa.
China claims to be a developing country, and this helps with the perception that it sees
itself as the same or equal to other developing states in the global South. Furthermore,
the Chinese believe that the West views Africa as a “patient rather than a partner” (Chan,
2013). In the Chinese perceptive, Western states have been mistaken with how they’ve
approached and developed diplomatic and economic partnerships with Africa. Cao
(2013) explains that there exists a Western perception that China, and Africa belong to
the same world of cultural “other” (61).
There is an argument that Western states made an ideological mistake in Africa
by concentrating solely on political reform instead of the economy. Rotberg (2008)
explains that the Chinese believe that Western-style democratic theory does not fit
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African conditions and has failed African states, which has kept these states
impoverished (12). Failure is attributed to the many political conditions and expectations
imposed on Africa in order to receive aid. China is resolute in their belief that democracy
does not guarantee prosperity and their economic success is proof of this.
Mutual benefit1 or reciprocity is an important element that China considers a part
of its political values that stems from Confucius doctrine. According to Confucian
tradition, raw exploitation is not allowed, and this is important when examining how the
Chinese differentiate themselves from colonial and imperial powers in Africa. China
promotes itself as non-interfering, fair and moral. According to Chan (2013) when
Chinese officials address and communicate with Africa with talk of peace, friendship,
and assistance, the PRC “means it” (15). These statements made by Chinese officials are
not intended to deceive or be naïve self-deceptions. Expropriation may take place
alongside or beneath the rhetoric, but “expropriation is not exploitation” (Chan, 2013, 1617). A return is expected with expropriation, and African governments look at their
relationship with China as both mutually beneficial and one that exhibits equality.
Fijalkowski (2011) writes that China aims to build a friendly image targeted to an Africa
audience by promoting the “win-win” mutual economic benefits from cooperation (221).
For these reasons, China is more attractive to states that may have felt ostracized by the
U.S. or other Western states.
Non-interference is an important aspect of Chinese political values. Mingjiang
(2008) finds that Chinese political and academic voices highlight the importance of

1

Studies of US and Japanese ODA have shown that humanitarianism explained aid disbursement (not
all neorealist). See studies by Poe (1990), Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985) on the U.S.; Tuman, Strand
and Emmert (2009) and Tuman and Ayoub (2004) on Japan; and Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor (1998) on
Japan.
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respect for "culture, social, political and ideological diversity in the world" (22). For
China, infringing on a state’s sovereignty is unacceptable. Chan (2013) describes the
concept of “soft power” as a theory that is instilled in Chinese foreign and domestic
policy (12). This approach allows China to establish diplomatic ties with a variety of
regimes and safeguard China’s sovereignty (Anshan, 75, 2007). There is also a
consensus that believes China should strategically build soft power because it offers an
alternative route to sustainable growth (Mingjiang, 2008; Anshan, 2007). In addition, it
provides legitimacy, promotes political alliances, and allows China to insulate itself from
criticism.
Despite fears, China does not wish to remake the world in its image or influence
the spread of communism. China's emphasis on non-interference help support its policy
objective to "peacefully rise" internationally (Blanchard & Lu, 2012, 570). The Chinese
government is focused on projecting a particular "image" to the outside world to show its
intentions are benign and “non-threatening” (Paradise, 2009, 647-648). This is another
reason China staunchly holds firm to its non-interference policy. However, the reason for
non-interference stems from China’s colonial past and why China seeks relationships
with the global South. China desires to develop its economy independently, but this
cannot, be achieved by the sole reliance on the West. China prefers diplomatic
relationships with states that respect China’s sovereignty and the governing regime.
Although China has developed its soft power resources in Africa, it receives
criticism of its political values of non-interference and mutual benefit. Domestically,
China has experienced impressive growth and alleviated many citizens out of poverty.
The perception of the economic model that China has followed is dependent on the
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audience. One opinion could see an efficient and effective government. Or perceive
Chinese development is attributed to an authoritarian regime that desires conformity
(Paradise, 2009, 577). China’s non-interference policy opens them up to criticism from
the Western and developed world because it is perceived that China does not care about
issues such as human rights, environmental degradation or political freedom.
Paradise (2009) finds that developing or authoritarian regimes that China has
diplomatic relations show little concern to China's governance and corruption issues
(578). Due to its relationships with states that have poor human rights records such as
Sudan, China faces criticism for not acting as a responsible power. Furthermore, the
criticism is based and perpetuated due to China's domestic human rights record (Paradise,
2009, 656). China is seen as an ally to these pariah states and ensures that these dictators
are kept in power. China is perceived as benefitting economically and not concerned with
encouraging any political or social reform (Paradise, 2009, 656).
Beijing's domestic policies are considered a hindrance to its soft power efficacy
(Yoshihara & Holmes, 2008, 134). Since political values are a direct link to the state,
Chinese soft power suffers from a lack of legitimacy due to its domestic policies in
regard to Tibet and Taiwan. On the political front, China faces criticism of its
authoritarian system and its relationship with other authoritarian regimes. According to
Gill and Huang (2006), there is an “imbalance between soft power, cultural
attractiveness, and Beijing’s domestic policies and values that are expressed through
foreign policy” (29-30).
China struggles from concerns of legitimacy and explains why China is
consistently on the defensive. China continues to work hard at building a particular and
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favorable image through soft power resources. According to Shambaugh (2011), China
should develop its South-South relationship and ensure diplomatic solidarity with African
states (16). Solidarity with the global South ensures that China receives support and
dodges criticism from the West over “issues such as Tibet, Taiwan, human rights and
climate change” (17). Therefore, China sees the participation in international
organizations as vital to securing the Chinese Communist Party agenda and foreign
policy objectives (Paradise, 2009, 664). One of which is its, "One China" policy. Beijing
has funneled numerous resources into Africa in order be an “integral part of Africa's
political and economic success” (Gill & Huang, 2006, 8). A constructive approach within
these institutions would further enhance China's peaceful image.

Foreign Policies
China’s foreign policies are based on their political values of equality, mutual
benefit, and non-interference. China understands the advantage of participating in
multilateral institutions and in order to achieve its foreign policy objectives. Ding (2008)
explains that the primary objective of China's foreign policy is to "preserve
independence, sovereignty, and territories" and “to create a favorable international
environment for China's modernization” (194-195). Siow (2010) finds that Chinese
officials identify soft power as a tool to enhance its “comprehensive strength” and
building a coalition of like-minded allies in order to further its foreign policies
objectives(1). Chinese scholarship considers soft power as an indicator of world status
and a mechanism to measure a state’s influence (Mingjiang, 2008, 13). Su Changhe
(2007) argues that soft power is a part of a “state's international institution building,
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agenda setting, mobilization of coalitions and the ability to fulfill commitments” (7). This
explanation further emphasizes the importance that China places on enhancing its role in
multilateral institutions.
Some Chinese scholars directly challenge Nye's conceptualization of soft power
in reference to foreign policy. Xuetong (2006) claims that soft power stems from the
“political power that is wielded by political institutions, norms, credibility, rather than
culture” (9). Huang and Ding (2006) argue that the rise of China is due to the
simultaneous development of both hard and soft power (22). Cho and Jeong (2008) find
that soft power works simultaneously for both domestic and international purposes. The
authors conclude that while China promotes their “national development strategy” it
simultaneously promotes the “harmonious society” objective (458). A double strategy
approach is believed to provide legitimacy to the Chinese Communist Party domestically
and internationally.
For many Chinese scholars, a great power needs both hard and soft power in order
to ensure that it remains in a beneficial position which allows it to compete
internationally (Mingjiang, 2008, 299). In their analysis of Chinese soft power, Yoshihara
and Holmes (2008) find that Chinese leadership view soft power as "direct competition in
great power terms" (134-135). Su Changhe (2007) argues that soft power relies on a
state's ability to build and influence international agenda setting, mobilizing coalitions,
and fulfilling its commitments (8). A foreign policy that promotes China’s preferred
image through soft power principles emphasizes that Chinese has domestic stability and
international power.
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China's foreign policy has shifted to complement its growing influence in the
world. China's has increased its participation and membership in international institutions
and organizations (Huang & Ding, 2006, 28). Ding (2008) describes soft power foreign
policies as economic cooperation, cultural and educational exchange, regular diplomatic
visits between China and its allies, participation in multilateral activities and institutions
(195). These strategies allow China to promote a friendly and peaceful image to the
outside world. Shi Yinhong describes China’s foreign policy as "smile diplomacy" (The
Economist, 2007). Smile diplomacy or “summit diplomacy” is a term to describe the
Chinese leadership’s commitment to numerous international visits abroad as both
symbolic and out of respect for African states (Anshan, 2007, 79-80). China has
ambitious plans for Africa, and these diplomatic visits promote cooperation and
reassurance to Africa that China values their relationship.
Gill et al. (2007) determine that Beijing's critique of the international system is
that it is "unfair" and "unrepresentative" because it is dominated by the United States
(574). According to Anshan (2007), China looked to Africa as an ally to protect their
states from imperialism and hegemony (71). Paradise (2009) finds that using soft power
measures such as participation and membership in international institutions carries out
China’s new security diplomacy. Furthermore, being a part of peacekeeping and antiterrorism activities provides confidence in China's foreign policies and that China is a
responsible power (656-657). Therefore, perceptions and suspicions that perpetuate
negative attitudes around China’s rise are “unwarranted” (Mingjiang, 2008, 308).
Public or cultural diplomacy is the Chinese government's attempt to project a
peaceful image, and that its intentions are non-threatening (Paradise, 2009, 647). Siow
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(2010) finds in existing scholarship on soft power that China should, "assert its voice"
(2). The Chinese “voice” is apparent in the promotion and development of Chinese media
(Siow, 2010, 1-2). China wants to reach a global audience to ensure it controls how its
image is shaped. Advancing the Chinese mass media in “order to project influence to the
international community” is also seen as a way to counter U.S. hegemony (Siow, 2010,
2).
Joshua Cooper Ramo (2004) coined the term, "Beijing Consensus" (28). The
“Beijing Consensus” places an emphasis on “innovation, experimentation, and
gradualism” (28). Ramo describes that the Beijing Consensus believes in development
that incorporates a state's culture and characteristics. However, China shirks away from
the “Beijing Consensus” and claims it is still a "developing country" (Paradise, 2009,
664). This perception puts China at an advantage because it claims that international
standards of environmental protection and human rights don't apply to their policies.
China does see the need for partnerships in the developing world in order to
provide greater regime legitimacy and insulation from western criticism (Gill et al. 2007,
8). If Africa, can improve economically and politically with China as a close ally, it
provides China with more of an advantage in implementing its foreign policy objectives.
This concept focuses on securing relations with pivotal regions that can safeguard China's
peaceful rise and supports China's ambitions to become a regional and international
power (Gill et al. 2007, 9). China sits at an advantageous position because of its historical
experience, rapid development and influence in global affairs.
According to Ding (2008) there is a perception that following the Cold War,
Africa was abandoned as a political and strategic priority to the United States (37).
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Therefore, Chinese support and diplomatic relations are valued by African states. Ding
further explains that this is why Africa is more than willing to follow and support China's
foreign policy preferences (38). China's “non-interference, political stability, economic
growth and no strings attached aid” are a contradiction to previous donors like the United
States that place expectations like political reform in order to receive aid (Heng, 2010,
288). China has supported its soft power agenda through trade and diplomacy in order to
broaden their power and influence (Heng, 277, 2010). Shambaugh (2011) claims that
because China's presence in Africa surpasses the United States, soft power in Africa
allows China to compete for more significant global influence (22). The Chinese have
proven to utilize soft power successfully through trade and diplomacy.
Soft power with Chinese characteristics emphasizes symbolic relationships. In
contrast to European and Western colonial powers, China actively cultivates and
strengthens its diplomatic relations with African states. Ding (2008) explains that
previous foreign aid was diverted and unable to help with infrastructure development in
Africa (199). The Chinese are quick to provide and promote generous gestures to their
African allies. Gestures include rebuilding of parliament buildings, stadiums, hospitals
and schools (Heng, 2010; Anshan, 2007; Ding, 2008). China has been successful in
establishing a favorable image in Africa through its international aid and development.
The image projected is that Chinese aid benefits rather than exploits Africa.
In the context of international organizations such as the United Nations, the
World Trade Organization, and even the International Olympics Committee, China has
emphasized and nurtured its relations with African member states. China has long
recognized that as a regional voting bloc, Africa as a continent has the dominance to

26

influence the outcomes of issues in international affairs. According to Bodomo (2009),
soft power provides China and Africa with an opportunity to have a balanced and
sustainable relationship through mutual respect, non-interference, diplomatic relations
and economic cooperation (173). According to Anshan (2007), China provides respectful
and conciliatory discussions instead of intervention and coercion that is attributed to
Western states (76).
China's support for international institutions coincides with Nye's (2004)
framework that participation in multilateral institutions like the United Nations can
provide a soft power platform (65). Furthermore, these institutions give China a place on
the world stage in order to promote a friendly and peaceful image through diplomacy
(Heng, 2010, 287). Besides working closely with its African allies in the United Nations,
China has developed additional diplomatic forums with Africa. Discussions include the
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). At its inception in 2006, 43 heads of
state and 48 African delegations attended the FOCAC. The FOCAC provides a place for
China and African member states to discuss specific issues such as aid, trade, and cultural
exchange in order to support Sino-African relations. Since 2006, Beijing has committed
various forms of support and commitments to African countries. This includes a
cancelation of US $1.42 billion of African debt (Gill et al. 2007, 5).
For many Chinese strategists, there is a belief that Africa is on a path to
exponential economic development. This idea is well received and is part of the basis of
why China desires a close diplomatic relationship with Africa (Gill et al. 2007, 8). China
continually speaks of its close relationship with Africa and fosters the message that the
relationship is built on reciprocity and China's development, and Africa's development is
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intertwined. For instance, Chinese Foreign Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Liu
Jiancho has stated, "China needs Africa, it needs Africa for resources to fuel China's
development goals, for markets to sustain its growing economy and for political alliances
to support its aspirations to be a global influence” (quoted in Gill et al. 2007, 9).
China does rely on Africa for resources, namely oil. China is the second largest
consumer of oil and works hard to maintain "non-interference" in states such as Nigeria,
Angola, and Sudan. There is a high priority for Beijing to have strong ties with resourcerich countries and energy suppliers. Figures estimate that “25 percent of China's oil
imports are from Africa” (Ding, 2008, 200). Bodomo (2009) argues that Africa has
sought out new partnerships other than western economies in order to build their own
struggling economies (171). Mazimhaka (2013) further describes Africa as a continent
that is fragile politically and economically. Therefore, Africa needs a relationship with
China because this relationship does provide opportunity for Africa to build its economy
(Chan, 2013, 120-121).
According to Gill & Huang (2006) Chinese soft power resources do not guarantee
desired policy outcomes (23). In some respects, China stymies its soft power growth
because of its focus on rebuking the "China threat thesis" (Mingjiang, 2008, 23). China is
very wary to advocate a "China Model" because it believes that this could look like a
direct challenge to the West. According to Gill & Huang (2006) there are “three major
factors” that challenge Chinese efforts to produce soft power. These hindrances are
"imbalances of resources, legitimacy, diplomacy concerns and lack of a coherent agenda"
(26). In addition, China is criticized for its lending practices in Africa and other
developing countries. This criticism stems from China binding loans to African exports to
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China. These practices contradict established loan agreements in the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Gill et al. 2007, 11).
In contradiction to its "harmonious world" agenda, China has received backlash
for its financial and diplomatic support of corrupt and brutal dictators in Africa (Ding
2008 202). China faces a deficiency in soft power because of these relationships, and it
directly affects its legitimacy. Due to its non-interference policy, China receives criticism
for supporting authoritarian leaders such as Robert Mugabe (Ding, 2008, 199). However,
Bodomo (2009) provides a counter argument and claims that China benefits greatly from
African political power (173). Bodomo (2009) refutes the perception that China has only
exploitive interests in Africa. The author believes that there is a mutual benefit that relies
on China and Africa working together politically. Both China and Africa can wield
power in the United Nations because China is a permanent member of the United Nations
Security Council with the veto power and Africa has a large voting influence (173).
African support provides China with greater political flexibility within international
institutions such as the IOC and the WTO.
In addition to international politics, there are domestic concerns within Africa.
These concerns include the influx of Chinese migrant workers, unfavorable working
conditions, racism and China's undercutting local African industries (Ding, 2008, 200).
Heng (2010) finds from various sources that there is a growing disdain in Africa for
Chinese migrant workers from China (292). It is considered more efficient and
economical to Chinese firms and businesses to hire skilled laborers from the mainland
instead of train local Africans (Anshan, 2007,81). These concerns within Africa may
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prove to hinder the spread of Chinese soft power within Africa due to concerns of
Chinese imperialism.
Conclusion
The scholarship provided in this literature review refers to Chinese soft power in a
variety ways. Kurlantzick (2007) refers to it as China’s “charm offensive” while Winton
(2013) describes it as China’s “economic statecraft” or even “smile diplomacy”. Some
authors like Chan (2013) directly question China’s true intentions in Africa and whether
its economic incentives are actually “rogue aid” (Naim, 2007, 95-96). It is safe to say that
regardless of its name, Chinese scholars, philosophers, and the PRC leadership have
embraced the theory because at the “core of soft power is culture” (Glaser and Murphy,
2009, 11). In addition, this may be why China has difficulty in cultivating soft power
because hard and soft power are simultaneously applied. However, China’s innovative
approach to focus on poverty alleviation is a form of attraction to developing African
states.
China needs Africa not just for resources but politically as well. The PRC knows
that economic growth is central to ensuring African states carry more political clout in
multilateral organizations. With this is mind, China believes Africa’s economic success
will “raise the profile of Africa at international forums such as the United Nations
General Assembly” (Taylor, 2004, 93). Taylor (1998) concludes that even as early as
1998, China had South Africa picked possibly to fill an additional seat on the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) (455). In addition, Nigeria seeks to represent the
African continent as a permanent member of UNSC (Amusen, 2006, 184). A potential
African permanent place plays a significant diplomatic role between China and Africa
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because an additional ally on the UNSC could be perceived as a threat and creates
conflict.
China is motivated by a need for non-western allies in the international
community in order to support its foreign policy objectives. One of Beijing2's principal
foreign policy objectives is its "One China" policy. The constitution reads that the
People’s Republic of China is the legitimate government of all of China. Therefore,
Taiwan and Tibet belong to mainland China. Taylor (1998) explains, that if Taiwan to
gained political legitimacy and independence this would result in embarrassment and a
“loss of face” for the Chinese Communist Party leadership (Taylor, 1998, 457). This is
not a risk China is willing to make and since China’s admission to the United Nations
General Assembly in 1979, Beijing has worked tirelessly at marginalizing Taiwan's
influence and denies Taiwan "international space" (Ding, 2008, 199). Beijing offered aid
and financial support in exchange for recognition (Taylor, 1998, 458). Without the
African voting bloc, China would not have been successful at transferring the UNSC seat
from Taiwan to China. At present, only 4 African countries have diplomatic relations
with Taiwan.
Soft power rests on regime legitimacy and China's relationships with some
African states provide a platform for critics that believe China is a direct link to
stagnating political reform (Huang and Ding, 2006, 38). Furthermore, China opens itself
up to criticism over its human rights record and authoritarianism and continually grapples
with its transparency. China wishes to be in direct control of its lending practices and not

2

Tuman and Shirali (2015) found that Chinese FDI in Latin America/Caribbean and Africa was
negatively associated with states that recognized Taiwan. The same study also found that countries that
ended their diplomatic recognition of Tawian during the study period experienced an increased in FDI after
ending recognition (this was in Chad, Senegal, and Costa Rica).
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criticized by Western financial institutions or governments. There is a belief in China that
too much transparency would make the existing regime vulnerable. Therefore, China’s
emphasis on it being a “developing country” allows it to bypass full transparency with its
donor activities. However, to counteract the external pressure of its lending practices, the
Chinese Export-Exim Bank signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in 2007 with
the World Bank. This MOU set out to provide more collaboration with the two financial
institutions in regard to energy and infrastructure projects in Uganda, Ghana, and
Mozambique (Gill et al. 2007, 12). Mingjiang (2008) concurs with Huang and Ding
(2006) and explains that although China possesses soft and hard power capabilities it still
lacks a "national comprehensive power structure" (14). The lack of soft power efficacy is
the result of China's gap between its domestic values and foreign policies. . This is why
soft power is considered Beijing's "underbelly" and although China is a rising regional
and international power, global leadership will take a lot more time (Huang and Ding,
2006, 22-44). Therefore, it is imperative for China to continue to cultivate and foster soft
power abroad to ensure legitimacy and trust in their foreign and domestic policy
endeavors.
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Table 2.1: Confucius Institutes and Classrooms within Africa
Country

Institute

Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burundi
Cameroon
Comoros
Congo
Egypt
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gambia
Ghana
Kenya
Liberia
Libya
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mozambique
Namibia
Nigeria
Rwanda
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leonne
South Africa
Sudan
Tanzania
Togo
Tunis
Tunisia
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe

1
1
1
1
1

Classroom

1
1
2
1
3

2

1
3
1

1

1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
5
1
2
1

3
1
1
1

1
1
1

Information retrieved from the Confucius Institute Headquarters (Hanban) online
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Chapter 3
Soft Power Influence within the United Nations General Assembly
A determinant of a state’s influence is its ability to establish partnerships with
national leaders from the international community. China’s thriving economy and
emergence as a rising power provides an alternative to Western dominated theories of
international organizations and diplomacy. China has a broad interpretation of foreign aid
to include “official development assistance, development grants, concessional loans and
state-sponsored or subsidized overseas investments” (Lum et al. 2009, 1). However, due
to China’s lack of transparency in it’s reporting of foreign direct investment, aid, loans
and grants it is a challenge to measure accurately.
According to Nye (2005) the United States has been able to produce soft power
by advocating shared values in the world like democracy and human rights (62).
Conversely, China provides an alternative to Western democratic theory and considers its
political values and foreign policy as universally appealing. These political values are
based on non-interference because it claims its only intention is to rise peacefully, and
China has no interest in remaking the world in its image. According to Susan Shirk
(2007), China’s path to peaceful development is based on three foreign policy initiatives;
“using economic ties to make friends, being a team player in multilateral organizations
and accommodating its neighbors” (109). These objectives are based on Chinese culture
and political values of non-interference and respect for a state’s sovereignty.
According to Zhang (2011), it is not only political values or foreign policies that
control and represent China's soft power. Chinese soft power deviates from Nye's
definition because Chinese soft power “integrates economic and diplomatic coercion”
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(52). Zhang’s analysis claims that China has created a hybrid of both hard and soft
power. Therefore, financial incentives and political relationships that China offers are
used simultaneously in order to achieve Beijing’s goals domestically and internationally.
China does not utilize soft power resources in the same context as the United
States. The United States has been able to build its soft power through a variety of ways,
which include culture, music, film and political values. However, as Nye (2004) notes
U.S. soft power has declined significantly following the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
(81). Alternatively, China promotes a peaceful image by its commitment to nonintervention and aversion to the use of hard power. However, with its growing
technological capabilities, modernizing weapons and the largest army in the world China
can utilize hard power when it sees fit.
China’s behavior is more consistent with emphasizing diplomacy over conflict.
According to Winton (2013), China uses “economic statecraft” to try and change the
existing world system that is dominated by western ideals (19). Most importantly, China
encourages other states to embrace China’s political values of state sovereignty and noninterference (19). The motivation for China is to play an intricate role within international
institutions in order to promote a credible and legitimate image. China aims to exercise
more influence in order to create an international environment that supports its foreign
and domestic policy preferences. For China, international organizations such as the
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) provide platforms to pursue these objectives.
China understands that international organizations are the creation of the states
that establish them. In order to fulfill its foreign policy initiatives, China must participate
in international institutions and engage with the outside world. Nye (2004) writes that
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China should actively utilize its membership in organizations and promote international
rules that encourage other member states to alter their behavior to coincide with Chinese
preferences. Nye continues that the result would be that China “will not need as many
costly carrots and sticks” (10-11). As a permanent United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) member China holds a diplomatic advantage that other emerging powers and
developing countries, such as those in Africa, do not possess. Therefore, China is
considered an attractive ally to non-permanent UNSC members. Taking a closer look at
institutions like the UNGA can provide insight into the soft power relationship that China
has built with African states.
Deng (2011) writes that for China, soft power is a sustainable tool to use in order
to influence other states in world politics. Furthermore, soft power allows a state to obtain
great power status and avoid the repercussions of hard power (64). Looking at Western
powers such as the U.S., China believes foreign intervention can be averted because
interventions by force do not guarantee a solution (Anshan, 2008, 38). From this
perspective, China has been able to secure its position as an emerging power while
simultaneously appealing to African leadership. China is not particular with its
diplomatic and economic relationships. Therefore, China is often criticized for its
relations with states that are considered rogue regimes or pariah states by Western
standards. However, China can and does dismiss criticism because of its economic
strength and diplomatic ties with other developing nations.
This chapter will focus on how Chinese soft power through economic aid and
relationships with African states protects China’s foreign policy objectives. Following a
brief discussion of the importance of economic ties, this chapter will describe the element
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of reciprocity in Sino-African relations. The basis of these diplomatic relationships is
common goals of economic growth, non-interference, and national sovereignty.

Economic Ties
As previously demonstrated, China invests a significant amount of resources in
Africa. The ability to measure soft power is challenging. However, since China considers
economic aid as a form of soft power, it is an important consideration when looking at
how soft power manifests itself in international institutions. China has acquired intangible
amounts of soft power through its economic growth and achievements (Pang, 2011, 127).
Therefore, following or emulating aspects of China’s economic model provides the PRC
leadership with legitimacy. To a large extent, economic ties bind states to one another
politically and promote alignment and support in international institutions.
A domestic concern for the PRC is to ensure China’s economic growth is
sustained. China needs African resources as much as Africa depends on Chinese
investment. In his research regarding trade between China and Africa, Winton (2013)
found China’s trade with Africa is concentrated in the natural resources of oil and raw
minerals. South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, Algeria, and Morocco possess the largest
economies in the region and China exports textiles, machinery, equipment, and other
goods to these states (5). Furthermore, in 1996 “Chinese companies purchased a 40
percent majority share in Sudan’s Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company” and “has
purchased as much as two-thirds of the country's oil exports” (Kleine-Ahlbrandt & Small,
2008, 41). China’s oil investments in the region are incredibly important to Beijing
because China must ensure its people’s demand for resources are met.
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Shinn and Eisenman (2012) found that between 2000 and 2010 “trade increased
from US $10 billion to US $130 billion” (114-115). However, the U.S. remains China’s
number one trade partner with total trade in 2013 at US $521 billion (report from Chinese
National Bureau of Statistics). Furthermore, in 2009 China did surpass the U.S. as
Africa’s number one trade partner. According to Dews (2014) in 2012, “China's trade
with Africa reached $198.5 billion while U.S.-African trade in 2012 was $99.8 billion”
(Brookings Online). China’s increasing influence in the region is due to these strong
economic ties.
China has demonstrated that economic success is obtainable without being
democratic. China understands soft power as a tool that allows the PRC to modify
international procedures in order to be consistent with its own interests and values will
provide China with increased legitimacy (Nye, 2004, 2)As a rapidly developing state,
China understands that economic growth and power is relative to the sway a state has in
international affairs. Therefore, China’s commitment of economic and development aid
to Africa is an attempt to provide Africa with more influence internationally.
The basis of Chinese financial support includes non-interference, reciprocity, and
other principles found in cultural ideology. These political values provide China with an
advantage because China appears as a more attractive ally compared to Western states.
This attraction is because a Chinese relationship does not require the same diplomatic
conditions of economic aid. Most importantly, Chinese financial support does not come
with expectations of political or social reform. According to Winton (2013) thirty-five
African states have received support in order to develop their infrastructure (12). China
has spent considerable amounts of money to build schools, hospitals, roads, stadiums and
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railways. Part of this heavy investment in infrastructure is due to ensuring a smooth and
consistent flow of trade between China and Africa. Nonetheless, without China’s
investment there would have been little to no progress made in developing the
infrastructure to these states.
China’s motives for infrastructure development cause considerable international
debate. This debate is not a surprise because China’s approach to investment is
contradictory to other development and economic aid provided to Africa by western
countries and international institutions. Naim (2007) believes that China provides “rogue
aid” and enables corruption in places like Nigeria. Citing a particular example, the World
Bank had negotiated a $5 million dollar project with Nigeria to improve its three
railways. However, the PRC “offered Nigeria $9 billion” for a complete overhaul of its
rail network. The generous aid package did not come with conditions or expectations to
reform, and China won the bid (95-96). There continues to be concern regarding China’s
economic motives in Africa and whether its policies are exploiting the continent.

The United Nations
Within China, there is a belief that, “soft power lies in the political power of
political institutions, norms, and credibility” (Li, 2013, 295). The UN provides an
opportunistic venue because the West is in the minority and China has developed allies
through its soft power resources. China has solicited support from other developing
nations in the global South. According to Taylor (1998) this has enabled China to resist
Western “hegemonism” (451). Therefore, China’s policy in Africa is not completely
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based on economic development but because Beijing seeks support in order to reject
Western criticism of its domestic policies.
China is fully aware of Africa’s value as a regional voting bloc. The sheer number
of African states can dominate and influence voting outcomes of relevant issues in
international affairs. With this in mind, China has emphasized and nurtured its relations
with African member states of international organizations such as the UNGA, WTO, and
the International Olympics Committee. In addition, African support through voting
alignments enhances the PRC’s domestic and international legitimacy.
In their research regarding voting alignments in the UNGA Kim & Russet (1996)
illustrated that there are voting patterns of member states in the UNGA. The authors
found that following the Cold War there was a “North-South” split due to the differences
between rich and poor countries. More specifically, that “voting alignments are likely to
be shaped by state preferences along developmental lines, and views of selfdetermination and economic development” (651). In addition, Kim and Russett (1996)
found that “self-determination reflects the South’s concern with neocolonialism as well
as classic colonialism” (633). These observations have been proven correct because as
the Global South develops economically these emerging states will expect to take on a
greater role in global governance.
Following the notion that voting alignments are shaped by state preferences
Africa as a voting bloc share a desire for self-determination and self-rule that coincides
with China’s political values. Although the U.S. has supported and financed national
independence movements, the U.S. is still considered a neocolonial power by many
African states. Although, past colonial exploitation is not the only reason for China and
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African states to align their votes, it does however, give China leverage when it
emphasizes equality, mutual benefit, and respect for state sovereignty.
China has a unique place internationally because of its intimidating economic
strength and politics. Kim and Russett (1996) point out that China is politically distant to
the other UNSC members. China has found itself ostracized especially over issues such
as human rights and political reform. China can and has utilized its “veto” against
resolutions that castes China in an unfavorable light. In addition to its veto power, China
can rely on its allies in the UNGA in order to shield it from resolutions that offend it
(650). More recently, Voeten (2000) found that China is leading a voting bloc to oppose
U.S. hegemony (213). Wenping (2007) further explains that China has utilized support
and has rallied Africa's voting strength in the UNGA in order to oppose "hegemonism
and power politics" (27).

Human Rights
An issue area where China relies on Africa’s support is over human rights. China
claims that criticism of its behavior is unfairly based on western standards (Anshan,
2008, 37). Brown and Sriram (2008) write that the PRC considers human rights a
“western creation” and that economic and cultural rights are the priority (252).
Furthermore, China perceives Western attempts of criticism as a way to humiliate and
question the PRC’s legitimacy (253). Beijing’s focus on economic and cultural rights
coincides with China’s commitment to economic development, enhance diplomatic
relationships and ensure China is left alone to rise peacefully.
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China is careful not to take a public position that would invite questions over its
human rights record. Despite its claims to never infringe on a state’s sovereignty, China
receives plenty of repercussions over its foreign policies. Zimbabwe, Sudan, and Kenya
are examples where China has staunchly stood by its policy of non-interference.
Applying cultural relativism to international relations, China has stated that the situation
in Sudan is a “humanitarian crisis,” not genocide (Huang, 2008, 307). The international
outcry was most apparent during the 2008 Beijing Olympics and human rights advocates
dubbing it the “Genocide Olympics” (Brown & Sriram, 2008, 266).
Africa as a voting bloc has supported China to defeat the eleven attempts to
criticize China's human rights records (Taylor, 2009, 155). Beginning in 1996, Taylor
(1998) claims that China wielded its influence in order to sway the African vote. During
the proposed condemnation of China’s human rights, fourteen African states voted
against the sanction (457). Many of these African states have received their own
criticisms over their domestic policies. Coinciding with China’s political values many
African leaders perceive UN motions such as these are unjustified and disrespectful of
state sovereignty (459).
China continues to build coalitions in order to shield itself from criticism. In
2004, the US sponsored a resolution at the UN Commission on Human Rights, which
aimed for China to yield to U.S. pressure and adopt international norms and transparency
regarding human rights. However, China responded with a proposed motion urging “no
action” this motion would block a debate that would embarrass the Chinese. With the
help of 27 states, including the African voting bloc making up half the votes, the “noaction” resolution passed. China’s economic and political partnerships have proven to
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pay off. Most of the African states that benefited from aid and targeted investment from
China like Sudan, Eritrea, and Zimbabwe provided critical support during the meeting.
Furthermore, sanctions imposed on Beijing could potentially hurt these developing
countries. Diplomatic support for China within the UNGA and the UNHRC provides an
economic and political incentive.
China reciprocates support by not shaming African regimes solely on the basis of
Western expectations. China has repeatedly expressed this position and will never
publicly denounce a state’s ability to govern. As Rotberg (2008) warns otherwise, the
world may critique “China’s actions in Xinjiang or Tibet and its harsh treatment of
cultural and religious minorities” (12). China is continually criticized over its “One
China” policy and its tight grasp of Tibet, Taiwan and other territories. Once again in
2008, China was criticized over events in Tibet. China received support from most
African countries on the UNHRC and the proposed resolution never passed.
In 2007, China blocked sanctions against Sudan at the United Nations and force
the Security Council to take a moderate approach with the Sudanese government (Alden,
2007, 62-63).China is not the only emerging power with economic interests in Sudan.
India and Malaysia have provided substantial investment and assistance to the war-torn
region and have aligned with China in blocking sanctions against Sudan. However, the
majority of Sudanese oil is purchased by China and China has the most to lose if
sanctions passed.
China provided a special envoy to Sudan which was successful in persuading
Khartoum to allow UN peacekeepers into Darfur (Brautigam, 2008, 36). However, in
2007 China’s chief planning agency “dropped Sudan” from its list of beneficiaries that
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are suitable for oil and gas company investment (35). The decision was significant
because China has adamantly stood by the Sudanese government. However, China’s
perceived severance with Sudan was short lived because following the peace settlement,
China provided a “US $3 million preferential loan” (Alden, 2007, 62). The loan aimed at
rehabilitating infrastructure and was considered Beijing’s “continuing economic
commitment” to the Sudanese authoritarian government (Alden, 2007, 62).
China’s response to the 2013 Kenyan elections is an example of China’s
commitment to non-interference and state sovereignty despite concerns from the
international community and human rights activists. In 2013, Kenyan voters elected
Uhuru Kenyatta as president and William Ruot as the Vice President. in despite that the
two men International concern was warranted since both Kenyatta and Ruot are charged
with “allegedly orchestrating the violence that followed Kenya’s 2007 presidential
elections” (Chen, 2013). However, China stayed silent and maintained its policy of noninterference in another state’s domestic affairs. According to Chen (2013), China's
silence over the Kenyan elections included an economic opportunity for the regime. The
Kenyan government received a commitment of “29 $US billion” from China (2).
China’s ability to protect itself from sanctions over its human rights also extends
to its neighbors in Asia. In 2007, China leveraged the African voting bloc in response to a
U.S. sponsored resolution to end political repression and human rights violations
committed by the Myanmar government and military (Graham, 2013, 104). China has
established a critical precedent and has proven that if it has enough allies in the
international community that it can repel any resolution proposed by the UNCHR
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(Kurlantzick, 2007, 147).In addition, China has proven that its diplomatic strength can
shield its allies when necessary.
One China Policy
China perpetuates it’s “One China” policy and the UNGA has been utilized as an
instrument for Chinese to wield its power and marginalize Taiwan. The “One China”
policy is ingrained into the Chinese education system and, therefore, creates a strong
sense of national pride. If Taiwan succeeds, it would be a loss of face and humiliate the
PRC. Furthermore, there is a belief that national honor is tied to the unity of China, and
the PRC would not give up Taiwan without a fight (Shirk, 2007, 186). Therefore, the
only consistent stipulation that China requires of states who want to receive aid, trade or
have diplomatic relations with China must adhere to its “One China” policy.
The PRC’s state constitution asserts, “that the People’s Republic of China is the
legitimate government of all of China, which includes the island of Taiwan” which also
includes territories like Tibet (Taylor, 1998, 457). Since the early 1970s, Taiwan has
gradually lost diplomatic recognition and allies due to its inability to compete with the
PRC. China’s reliance on the African bloc started as early as 1971. Without the African
voting bloc, China would not have been successful in its bid to transfer the UNSC seat
from Taiwan to China. Deng and Zhang (2011) find that “China has defeated Taiwan's
fourteen attempts to re-enter the United Nations over the past twenty years” (155).
Although Beijing won back, its UN seat in 1971, Taiwan did not fully surrender
its ambitions of self-rule. Taiwan has continued to seek out diplomatic recognition and
has transitioned into a democracy. The majority of African countries recognized Taipei as
China at independence; some refrained from recognizing either Taipei or Beijing and
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official recognition came with aid. China promised and continues to provide financial
support, even where there is no economic return because China understands how critical
the African voting bloc is (Taylor, 1998, 458). Furthermore, Africa to some extent has
benefited from the competition for recognition between China and Taiwan (458). African
state leaders have sold their support to whichever state provides the most attractive
incentives.
Taylor (2002) provides several examples of flip-flopping such as Senegalese
leadership switched three times from Beijing to Taipei in order to receive aid. In addition,
Gambia declared Taiwan as independent in 1995 and received a “US$35 million aid
package from Taiwan” (458). In 1997, “São Tomé and Príncipe negotiated US$30
million over three years” just for recognizing Taipei. With a GDP of $45 million this was
a significant amount for the country to receive (Taylor, 2002, 458). The aid package has
proven to be a good investment because São Tomé and Príncipe currently recognize
Taiwan.
Despite the flip-flopping, currently, only 3 African states have full diplomatic
relations and acknowledge the Republic of China. These states are Swaziland, São Tomé
and Príncipe, and Burkina Faso. For Taipei, recognition by African countries despite their
size is necessary because Taiwan desires to achieve diplomatic and economic status but is
weary to promote itself as a political entity (Taylor, 2002, 456). Presently, 21 UN
member states and the Holy See recognize Taiwan. Taiwan sees such a policy as crucial
to maintaining international legitimacy and to projecting its profile abroad to gain
“international living space and global identity” (Taylor, 2002, 457). Taipei and Beijing
share a similar goal of acquiring individual support from any state that it can. Since that,
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“each country has one vote in the United Nations” and even “tiny” states like Swaziland
and Seychelles have political and symbolic importance this provides a platform for China
and Taiwan to compete for allies (Taylor, 1998, 457).
Shirk's (2007) explains that Taiwan plays “a crucial role” in China’s foreign
policy, because it is a matter of “regime security and not national security” (185). Since
the PRC believes that international power will strengthen its domestic legitimacy the fear
of Taiwan’s independence would cripple the regime’s reputation. The PRC fears it would
create a domino effect and Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia will pursue succession
(Shirk, 2007, 182). The PRC fears consequences such as the loss of legitimacy; Chinese
citizen’s demand for political reforms or a change in leadership.
China has invested significant resources in order to receive official recognition.
China advocates such a strong commitment to state sovereignty because China believes
that it can govern Taiwan and any of its territories as it deems necessary. In an effort to
legally quiet the independence movement, China passed the “Anti-Secession Law” in
2005. It was considered an attempt to warn Taiwan that China would use force if
necessary to block independence but not coerce reunification (Shirk, 2007, 205).
However, with its exponential economic growth and political clout, Beijing can pursue its
aggressive policy against Taipei. In particular, China can wield its veto at the UNSC. The
veto provides China’s with the ability to influence Taiwan’s future. In addition, China
can utilize its UNSC permanent seat to “dissuade other economically stable or ambitious
nations from holding official relations with Taipei” (Taylor, 2002, 28).

Conclusion
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China’s influence in the world has grown simultaneously with its economy. China
has a deliberate agenda for Africa. China’s soft power complements its foreign and
economic policies in an effort to strengthen diplomatic ties. Following the Tiananmen
Square incident in 1989, African states were the only nations in the UN to support China
when it faced international criticism (Taylor, 2006, 939). Following the events, China
was considered a pariah state and had to work diligently to repair its international image
and develop diplomatic ties with Western countries. Currently, China still claims that it is
a developing country and makes a great effort to differentiate itself from Western and
European powers. Although China does not claim that its economic policy should replace
the Washington Consensus, China’s prosperity and growth has given reason to look more
closely at the regime and economic alternatives for the developing world.
Obiorah et al. (2008) write that the shift for many African states is due to the
commitment of poverty alleviation. The Washington Consensus model emphasizes
democracy while the China model places emphasis on “bread” rather than the “vote”
(288). China claims to base its aid on mutual benefit and reciprocity. Therefore, China
sends a different to message to African states and does not cast itself in the role of a
“superior” state that provides for an “inferior” state (Wenping, 2007, 33). However,
African leaders should be wary to place economic success before human rights and
political reform (Obiorah et al., 2008, 292-293). Therefore, the African Union should
take a productive role to ensure the continent’s resources and economies are protected.
There is reported Chinese backlash in numerous countries within Africa. Cheap
merchandise from China has replaced local African textiles and garments which resulted
in local businesses and factories to close down because they are unable to compete with

48

cheaper Chinese made products (Wenping, 2007, 26). Furthermore, factory closures
have contributed to high unemployment rates in places like South Africa. In response to
public outcry, Wenping (2007) writes that China placed a self-imposed quota of textile
and garment products in South Africa (26).This is encouraging because one of China’s
criticisms is that it needs to be a responsible power and apply sustainable practices to its
business dealings in the world market.
China has found on occasion that unwavering support for fragile, unpopular,
authoritarian regimes in the long term can damage its reputation and legitimacy (KleineAhlbrandt & Small, 2008, 39). Since 2007, “China has become the largest trading partner
of Iran, North Korea, and Sudan and the second largest of Burma and Zimbabwe” which
reflects negatively on China (41). With allies such as these, China has learned that
sometimes intervention is necessary. Although China’s policies in Africa are driven by
the need to sustain China’s economic development China will play a critical role in the
region because of its economic ties to other developing states. There are limits to China’s
commitment to non-intervention and this was exhibited in 2006 when China took a more
decisive role after the peace agreements failed in Sudan. There was worry that the
escalated fighting in Sudan would potentially spill over to neighboring Chad and could
invite Western military intervention. (Kleine-Ahlbrandt & Small, 2008, 46). Therefore,
the conflict in Sudan was threatening Chinese business and economic interests in the
region. Since the separation between Sudan and South Sudan, China procured a US $1
billion in loans and credits from the China-Exim Bank for South Sudan (Hang, 2014, 1).
China continues to have exclusive oil rights in the region.
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China as an emerging power has economic interests to protect, and there are limits
to its unwavering non-interventionist approach. Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small (2008)
explain that China never will fully align with Western policy but will take care not to
align itself entirely with the authoritarian and rogue regimes of the world (56). Although,
this mindset has shifted slightly in regard to China’s relationship with places such as
Sudan and the newly independent South Sudan China still maintains “quiet diplomacy”
(Shambaugh, 2007, 26). Furthermore, due to China’s unwillingness to denounce rogue
regimes publicly, China has been an intricate player in negotiations with countries such
as Iran, Sudan, and North Korea. Therefore, China’s ability to broker negotiations with
outlying states with the UN may help it enhance its international and domestic
legitimacy.
China’s Africa policies deserve attention because China relies on Africa’s oil and
mineral resources. In addition, Africa is the “largest single regional grouping of states”,
and African countries have a tendency towards “bloc voting in multilateral institutions”
like the UNGA (Alden, 2005, 21-22). Historically, African governments have provided
support to China when its policies or behavior is criticized. Therefore, the relationship
between China and African states is worthy of closer study and research.
Sun (2014) writes that “Africa is a low priority in China's overall foreign agenda”,
and the international attention is “disproportionate” (15). However, there is still much to
gain from looking more closely at how China cultivates its soft power through economic
ties and political alignments. China has created its own definition of soft power that
incorporates Chinese characteristics and is considered an example to the developing
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world. As states emerge and compete with one another for resources, China will play a
significant role in the world economy and international institutions like the UNGA.
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Chapter 4
Data, Methodology, and Results

Nye (2004) explains that soft power “works indirectly by shaping the
environment and may take many years before desired outcomes come to fulfillment”
(99). Measurement of Chinese soft power is especially difficult because there is a lack of
reported data, particularly in overseas aid, and other “deficiencies” in the literature that
explain Chinese perception of soft power (Blanchard & Lu, 2012; Heng 2010). Despite
the shortcomings, this thesis attempts to quantify Chinese soft power by studying voting
affinity in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).
Black (1968) explains that the “long-range goal of foreign aid is political” (18).
Also, foreign aid does not necessarily determine voting alignment, the relationship
between aid and voting is worthy of consideration (Black, 1968, 19). With the SinoAfrican relationship based on reciprocity, China has taken numerous measures to shape
an international environment that is supportive of its rise. These measures include
economic incentives and partnerships through trade, aid, and foreign investment.
Financial incentives are a debated form of soft power because it may resemble financial
bribes (Blanchard & Lu, 2012). However, China considers economic partnerships and the
creation of economically beneficial relationships to be part of its soft power resources;
we can test whether there is a relationship between economic incentives and voting
affinity. Chinese aid activities include” concessional loans, grants, debt cancelations,
financial investments, and infrastructure building” (Lum et al., 2009). This research
speculates that the broad range of foreign direct investment and aid manifests itself in the
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form of political capital. In particular, it results in greater support for China in the United
Nations.
Previous research has shown that Africa is prone to bloc-voting and alignment
with other nations in the Global South, such as China (Kim & Russet, 1996; Voeten,
2000). Additional research has found that African countries tend to vote in alignment
with China in issue areas such as human rights and state sovereignty (Wenping, 2007;
Alden, 2007). In contrast to Russett and Kim (1996), Voeten (2000) finds that the postCold War voting is “one dimensional” (186). Furthermore, Voeten found evidence that
supports the hypothesis that regime type affects their voting behavior (213).
Other research has found that African states are not the only region to vote in
similarity. Burmester and Jankowski (2014) looked more carefully at Pacific Asia’s
“voting cohesion” in the United Nations General Assembly (680). The authors concur
with prior assertions put forth by Ferdinand (2013), and found other Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members are “much more aligned to China than to
Japan” (686). Another assessment of voting affinity in international institutions
conducted by Burmester and Jankowski (2014) applies the concept of “voting cohesion”
to the European Union (1492). The author’s find that smaller states of the European
Union feel inclined to vote “cohesively in a bloc to enhance their individual influence
through collective action” (1505).
Earlier research conducted by Wang (1999) found evidence that U.S. foreign aid
had been successfully “utilized to induce foreign policy compliance in the United
Nations” (199). Dreher, Nunnenkamp and Thiele (2008) found “evidence that US aid
buys voting similarity” in the UNGA (139). This research applies the same concept to
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African states voting affinity with China in the United Nations General Assembly. Also,
Dreher et al.(2008) found that US aid with few restrictions placed on recipient was more
efficient in buying political support (141). Since, China applies very little restrictions to
receive economic assistance the hypothesis put forth by Dreher et al. (2008) may explain
African voting affinity to China.
Voeten's (2011) affinity scores data shows that the 24 African countries in this
sample averaged an 85.7% voting alignment with China from 1999 to 2011. The states
that averaged 90% or higher voting affinity with China were: Egypt (92%), Algeria
(91%), Sudan (91%), Libya (91%), Gambia (90%), and Tunisia (90%). Published
Chinese FDI figures during the 1999-2011 time frame show that these specific African
states are not the highest recipients of Chinese FDI. However, in the case of Libya and
Sudan, Chinese FDI may have been limited due to existing UNSC sanctions (Global
Policy Forum). Furthermore, increased trade and aid between China and Africa may have
contributed to the similarity in voting. For pariah states like Sudan, China is a powerful
ally, and Sudan would be expected to exhibit strong voting similarity because it lacks
diplomatic relationships.
Alternatively, Cameroon averaged a 68% voting affinity with China between
1999 and 2011. China’s National Bureau of Statistics published “-17.118” of FDI in
Cameroon in 2007. The same year, Cameroon’s voting affinity was 64% and dropped to
56% the following year. Although, China has reported FDI flows to Cameroon there has
been a decline in FDI since 2008. Cameron received over $2.1 million in Chinese FDI
and in return there was a 56% voting similarity. In 2009, Cameroon received $1.7 million
in FDI, and there was a slight shift upwards to 58% voting similarity. However, in 2010
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and 2011 China contributed $870,000 and $216,720 of FDI to Cameroon. This resulted in
a 58% voting similarity in 2010 and the lowest voting similarity score in 2011 at 52%. In
the case of Cameroon, voting affinity since 2007 had never reached the 2002 high of
“86%.” This leads to the hypothesis that the economic incentives China provides to
developing African states affects their voting alignment.
The UN as a democratic institution gives every state an equal vote. Therefore,
every state can use its political support as economic leverage. Dreher et al. (2008) point
out that small states may be favored by donors because they can be bought “relatively
cheap” (140). Open voting shows other UNGA members where each state stands
politically and ideologically on a given issue (Rai, 1972). The Chinese Communist Party
can enhance its legitimacy and political capital by getting other countries' support of
Chinese interests on the international record.
Besides the symbolic act of voting, there are other avenues by which China can
create its sphere of influence by pursuing diplomatic relationships with African states.
With 54 member states, Africa is the largest voting bloc. The second largest is the AsiaPacific group with 53 members. Therefore, a South-South alignment reduces China's
isolation in the UN Security Council, despite countervailing efforts by the United States,
France, and the United Kingdom (Kim and Russet 1996). Therefore, China works hard to
nurture diplomatic and economic relationships with African states. They then seek to
parlay the subsequent goodwill into a UN voting coalition that is loyal to Chinese
interests.
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Data Collection / Method
The units of analysis for this project are year dyads from 1999-2011. The sample
consists of 24 African states between the years of 1999-2011. Wang (2007) describes
China’s economic influence as “multifaceted” (5). Furthermore, China is perceived as
“market, donor, financer, investor, contractor, and builder” to Africa (23). Therefore,
since China considers economic incentives a part of its soft power efficacy the variables
of aid, trade, gross domestic product (GDP), and foreign direct investment are all
considered worthy units of analysis for this study. Chinese FDI figures were retrieved
from China’s National Bureau of Statistics. FDI was employed as a measure because
Chinese aid and other economic investments are broad, may overlap, and lack
transparency (Lum et al. 2009; Brautigam 2011).
Although aid is considered an explanatory variable, these yearly amounts are not
published by China. However, the data collected for aid is from China.aidata.org, a webbased source that gathers information about Chinese development to Africa is still a part
of the data set. The sources to compile information on aid and development are taken
from a variety of published sources such as news reports, press releases, speeches, and
business proposals. Therefore, in lieu of consistent aid figures, Chinese FDI figures may
help determine if economic incentives provide China with higher voting affinity.
The 24 African states used in this study are: Algeria, Angola, Botswana,
Cameroon, Egypt, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco,
Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania,
Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia.
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The dependent variable in this study is operationalized as the trichotomous
UNGA affinity score (1=yes, 2=abstain, 3=no) of each African nation vis-a-vis China, as
elaborated by Voeten (2011). Voeten’s (2011) data is organized into the year, country a,
country b and affinity score. The scores used for this study are those that China is labeled
as “country a” and the other 24 African states are labeled as “country b” from the years
1999-2011. Although Voeten’s data set included all African states only 24 are included as
this voting bloc consists of countries officially identified as FDI recipients in financial
reports issued by the Chinese Bureau of Statistics. Each year is calculated on its own and
can provide some explanation of when there was a deviation from one state to the next
since not all scores are the same every year for every African country. Also, since it has
been proven that African countries are prone to bloc voting Voeten’s (2011) data set will
be used two ways. One will look at the affinity score of every African state as an
individual country. The other will see African states as a voting bloc and combine all
their scores together.
Limitations to Voeten’s data set is that the data published is to 2011, and the use
of this data for this study only provides a short window of 13 years. However, the time
span may still shed some light on voting behaviors and alignments. Furthermore,
restrictions on the data set are that it does not take into consideration the “behind doors”
political agreements or discussions between diplomats that may influence voting. In
addition, the affinity scores used in this sample include all issue areas when voting
occurred. Therefore, specific issue areas when votes matter more such as ”human rights”
are not a part of the data results and may affect the outcome since voting similarity may
differ across issue area.
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The primary explanatory variables are Chinese aid, trade, and FDI. The control
variables are state terror and real per capita GDP. The FDI data, obtained from China’s
National Bureau of Statistics, are reported in US dollars, adjusted for inflation. The
source used to deflate Chinese figures was the World Development Indicators published
by the World Bank. The trade input is the sum of real imports and exports between China
and the aforementioned 24 African states, as reported by the International Monetary
Fund. Measures of Chinese aid to Africa can be found at china.aiddata.org, which
displays all officially financed Chinese development projects from 2000-2012.
The Political Terrorism Scale (PTS) data is based on annual human rights reports
published by Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department. PTS was chosen as a
variable because following its inception in the 1980s it has been utilized as a tool to
empirically test where U.S. foreign aid was being distributed and if it was sent to states
that violated international human rights standards (Political Terror Scale Online). Since,
this thesis examines the relationship between economic incentives and African bloc
voting there may be a relationship between affinity and PTS.
Terror, in this case, refers to state-sanctioned killings, torture, disappearances, and
political imprisonments. The scale of measurement is between 1 (rare reports of political
terrorism) and 5 (frequent reports of political terrorism). China's score of four remained
consistent from 1999-2013. Only in 2007 did they achieve a rating of three. The
improved rating may have been indicative of China’s candidacy for the 2008 Olympic
Games. Most African states fluctuate between three and four like China. Sudan stayed a
consistent five during this time frame. However, there are a few outliers such as
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Seychelles that averaged a one ranking between the years of 1999 and 2011. Following
Seychelles, Botswana, Mali, Mauritius, and Senegal averaged a score of two.

Results
As seen in Table 4.1, none of the independent variables exhibits a statistically
significant correlation with the affinity scores of the countries in this particular sample. In
fact, there are no major relationships among any of the variables, including the
interaction terms that are comprised of them. Future versions of this research angle
should incorporate a larger sample of countries, or focus on a sample drawn from another
region. As previously mentioned, a challenge to this study is that Chinese foreign aid is
reported in various years. Therefore, the foreign aid figures that were used in 1999-2013
are sometimes reported as “0” unlike the FDI reported values. This could potentially
explain why aid as a variable did not support the hypothesis since there were missing
values for various states in sporadic years ranging between 1999 and 2011 skewing the
results. A negative correlation may be avoided if the statistical model was limited to a
smaller time span and only include African states that receive consistent yearly aid.
Table 4.2 is a Pearson correlation matrix that measures the relationship between
voting affinity, FDI, GDP, aid, trade, and PTS. None of the variables provided a strong
relationship. In fact, between affinity and the variables of FDI, GDP, aid, trade, and PTS
there was either no or negligible relationship. The sample of 24 countries selected was
based on the number of FDI recipients, which is not the total number of FDI recipients
and is also smaller than the total number of African trade partners with China. In
addition, the 24 counties may not represent the full list of African states that receive aid
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form China. In addition, the data provided is in total dollars, and not adjusted through a
log transformation or GDP. As a result, appropriate caution should be exercised in
interpreting the results because of the limitation in how the sample was selected and due
to the scale used for the data. Lastly, further research should develop a more elaborate
statistical regression model in order to examine the relationship with the appropriate
controls applied
Figure 4.1 displays general trends of Chinese FDI funds to African states and how
these states voted en bloc. It shows that the amount of Chinese FDI rose steadily from
1999 and only took a slight dip between the years of 2002-2003 and between the years of
2008-2009. Following 2009, it increased steadily back up and above 2008 Chinese FDI
figures. Figure 1 also shows that voting affinity in 1999 until 2002 rose between the
averages of .78 to an average of .9 for the African voting bloc. However, similarity
declined slightly between the years of 2002-2005 from .9 to .88 before dropping to .85 in
2006. Affinity shifted up slightly in 2007 with more funds allocated to FDI to .87.
Although FDI rose between 2007 and 2008 African voting affinity dropped to .84.
Following the 2008 UNGA Chinese FDI dropped but voting affinity rose to .87. Finally,
between 2010 and 2011 Chinese FDI rose to an all-time high while voting affinity
dropped to .79. The fluctuation in affinity scores can be attributed to variations in UNGA
resolutions or the political climate.
Figure 4.2 displays general trends of Chinese trade (per capita) and voting affinity
in the UNGA. Between the years of 1999 to 2011 Chinese trade per capita has climbed
substantially only to take a few dips between the years of 2002-2003 and 2008-2009. The
trade data presented in Figure 4.2 consists of the 24 African states used in this sample and
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treated as a whole unit. Since African states tend to vote in bloc there may have been a
trend of affinity similarity growing with trade. However, this is not the case because trade
per capita has gone up and voting affinity has dropped to 0.79 in 2011.
Figure 4.3 displays the variation in affinity for separate African states. Two
different graphs are displayed, and African states are organized in order of highest to
lowest GDP. The first graph shows that states with a higher GDP are more consistent in
their voting. Seychelles is the only outlier as its voting similarity to China dropped from 1
in 2005 to .5 in the year 2006. However, voting affinity recovered by the 2007 UNGA
session and then continued to waver down to .7 in 2010. Unfortunately, there were no
affinity scores published in Voeten’s (2011) data set for Seychelles in 2011. There is little
evidence that explains the drastic dip in voting affinity between China and Seychelles in
2006. Relations between the two countries seem to be strong as Seychelles has offered
China a PLA Naval Base (Singh, 2011).
On the second graph in Figure 4.2 there are more outliers which include
Cameroon, Liberia, and Uganda. Between the years of 2002 to 2011 Cameroon’s voting
affinity declined from .85 to .55. The largest drop of .2 points in voting affinity happened
between 2002 and 2004. Cameroonian voting affinity did shift slightly between 2004 and
2006 to almost .1. However, following a slight bump in 2006 it has stayed consistently
under .6 between the years of 2008 to 2011. Liberia surfaces as an outlier due to lack of
affinity scores between the years of 1999-2003. However, following the 2003 UNGA
session Liberia’s affinity with China joined the mainstream and has stayed consistent
with other African states. Lastly, Uganda as an outlier shows that between the years of
2003-2006 were the lowest affinity scores. The scores ranged from .7 to .65. This drop in
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voting similarity may be explained by the lack of FDI invested by China during those
years. The Chinese National Bureau of Statistics did not publish any FDI figures to
Uganda during 2003 and 2004. However, it did publish an FDI amount of $1.8 million to
Uganda in 2005. Although it was not until 2007, that Ugandan voting affinity with China
shifted up to .92. Currently, Uganda and China have strong ties economically. In 2014,
the “China National Oil Shore Corporation won the right to develop Uganda's Kingfisher
Field for $2 billion” and has invested heavily in an oil refinery and railroad construction
across East Africa (Akumu, 2014).

Conclusion
The research question proposed for this study was whether Chinese aid,
development, loans, debt forgiveness, and investment may explain African voting affinity
in the UNGA. It is a challenging endeavor to measure something intangible like soft
power. Although African states exhibited an average of 85.7% affinity with China,
neither trade, aid, FDI, PTS nor GDP adequately explains voting behavior.
The data are subject to substantial measurement error due to the lack of
transparency in PRC reporting of FDI and aid. However, as time passes, China is
expected to publish more figures on its economic assistance and development to comply
with international standards. The statistical insignificance of the findings within may be
indicative of China’s successful cultivation of soft power in Africa. However, since
China’s trade and other economic investments in Africa continue to grow while African
affinity has dropped this supports the notion that voting affinity does not accurately
capture soft power utility. In addition, this study is limited in its scope because it does not
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include other states, such as the United States or countries that have a colonial attachment
to Africa. Including these states may produce more findings to compare how Africa
responds politically to these other countries.
What, then, motivates African voting affinity with China if not economic
inducements? If soft power cannot be explained by voting affinity or other economic
incentives that China claims are a part of its soft power resources then future studies must
look at African citizens’ perceptions of China. A different explanation is that “a country
may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries – admiring its
values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness – want to
follow it” (Nye, 2004, 5). Perhaps China asks very little politically from its relationships
with African states? If a country can receive aid and Chinese investment for
acknowledging China over Taiwan and China can count on your vote in a time of need
then China offers an innovative approach to soft power utility. As time goes on and
states compete with one another for resources, perhaps their expectations of a recipient
state will become less complicated in order to solidify these economic and political
relationships. If this partly accounts for the lack of correlation above, then such soft
power mechanisms should be quantified. However, many consequential diplomatic
conversations and negotiations are unobservable. Future research should concentrate on
compiling more extensive data on China’s foreign aid and other international
transactions.

63

Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Description

0.5

1

0.857

0.077

Possible values range from –1 to
+1

-17.118

'147,429

'5,226

'20,170

Source: Natl Bureau of Statistics
of China

'14,850

1.33*1011

1.01*1010

Limited data availability for this
variable

Real Trade

0

'35,770

Real GDP

0

5.16*1011

Political Terrorism

1

5

Dependent
Variable
Affinity Score
Independent
Variables
Real Chinese FDI
Real Aid

1.07*109

'1,902
4.29*1010
3.06

Note: All amounts in US dollars
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'4,373
7.83*1010
0.86

Total volume of trade: exports +
imports
Based on World Bank data
Higher scores indicate more
state terror

Table 4.2 Affinity Correlations
Affinity
Real FDI

-0.0795
(-0.2205)

Real GDP

0.0688
(-0.2202)

Real Aid

-0.2881
(-0.0001)

Real Trade

0.0152
(-0.7868)

PTS

-0.0681
(-0.2351)

Correlations are shown with significance in parenthesis
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Figure 4.3: Affinity of Individual African Countries
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Chapter 5:
Conclusion

This thesis is aimed to examine more carefully the relationship between China
and Africa. A variety of both Western and Asian scholarship has been provided to more
adequately explain Sino-African relations. In particular, the research reveals that this
burgeoning relationship is based on China’s successful utilization of its own style of “soft
power”. According to Nye’s (1990) original thesis, the term “soft power” is the ability for
a state to get what it wants without threat or coercion. A state achieves the compliance of
another state because the other country is attracted to the other “state’s culture, political
values, and foreign policies”.
To some extent, China’s behavior coincides with Nye’s definition. China offers
an innovative approach to its relationship with Africa. In contrast to previous powers like
the United States, the European Union, and Japan, China does not attach aid with
expectations for political reform. China’s “no-strings attached” aid is an alternative for
developing states that wish to bypass the bureaucracy of the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund. In fact, China has successfully shut out competition
between international institutions because it can promise exorbitant aid and investment
packages (Naim, 2007, 95-96). Some research has found that Chinese aid is “tailored” to
each individual country China establishes economic and political relations with (TanMullins et al. 2010, 880). Therefore, aid can be in the form of debt-forgiveness, grants,
concessional loans, and infrastructure development which is consistent with other
findings put forth by Lum et al. (2009) and Brautigam (2011).
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China has spent a considerable amount of time fostering better relations with
African states by investment in its infrastructure, building schools, hospitals, and
government buildings. In addition, China devotes a substantial amount of money to the
expansion of its Confucius Institutes all over Africa and scholarships for African students
to study in China. China’s “attractiveness” can also be attributed to China’s foreign
policies that forbid interference in another state’s affairs. Furthermore, for both struggling
and developing African nations China whether it admits it or not is considered an
economic model and an alternative model to the United States and European countries.
China’s commitment to non-intervention, its growing economy, and political
power is a form of attraction and emulation for African states. Also, China’s focus on
economic development instead of political reform is also a kind of appeal for regimes that
do not aspire to become democracies. Therefore, for China its ability to rise peacefully in
a Western-dominated international system while the PRC remains in power is a form of
attraction. For some African states, China symbolizes the new wave of emerging powers
and the shift of power and resources in the age of globalization.
Chinese soft power deviates from Nye’s definition in a variety of ways because
China’s relationships are based on mutual benefit. Although, the concept of “reciprocity”
is considered a Chinese cultural attribute and may invoke emulation from African states.
Chinese mutual benefit has an economic focus and Nye distinctly explains that payments
are not a part of soft power but are more attributed to “hard power”. China has
simultaneously tried to develop its soft power while building its economic relationships
with Africa through trade, foreign direct investment, aid, and loan/debt forgiveness.
However, as noted China’s domestic and foreign policies are closely interwoven with its
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economic development. Therefore, Huang and Ding (2006) explain that there is a “gap”
or “imbalance between the pillars of soft power” which are culture, domestic values, and
foreign policies (41). Furthermore, China as an emerging power will be challenged also
to exhibit that it is a responsible power. International criticism during the Beijing 2008
Olympics eventually caused China to intervene in Sudan. China displayed its diplomatic
ability to facilitate a cease-fire but not until it was embarrassed internationally.
China’s primary focus is its development, and it cannot develop without being a
part of the international system. China has worked hard to create and international
environment that is supportive of its peaceful rise. Nye (2012) describes that “non-state
actors such as the United Nations” will become even more important because they
distribute power to individual states (152). The United Nations General Assembly
(UNGA) in an international forum where China can wield its influence. The influence is
most apparent when votes on specific issues arise that concern human rights and
Taiwanese independence.
Much scholarship has explained that China has relied on the African voting bloc
on many occasions and was instrumental for Mainland China’s UNSC permanent seat.
On the surface, it appears that there is a South-South voting alignment between China
and the African voting bloc included in this study. However, looking at both the
individual states and as a group there has been a decline in voting similarity. This may be
indicative of African states expecting more from their relationship with China. In 2012,
South African President Jacob Zuma referred to Africa’s disproportionate trade
relationship with China as “unsustainable” (Hook, 2012). Therefore, the importance of a
Sino-African relationship cannot be defined as one based solely on China’s economic
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development. China needs Africa politically because the PRC is “domestically fragile”
(Pu & Schweller, 2011, 66). Although China has become more open to the world, it will
continue to focus inward to ensure regime stability. South-South cooperation and
solidarity in the UNGA and China’s UNSC permanent seat ensures that the PRC receives
legitimacy (symbolic or not) internationally which is essential for its legitimacy at home.
Chinese engagement in Africa creates both positive and negative consequences.
Stories of racism, exploitation and environmental degradation on behalf of China are
reported in the media. Also, due to China’s “no strings attached” policies they keep
regimes in power that are rated the lowest on the Political Terrorism Scale. Recently, the
Guardian reported that China has executed numerous citizens over the years from Kenya,
Nigeria, South Africa, Zambia, and Uganda for drug trafficking (Akumu, 2014).
Although, these respective governments intervened and attempted to utilize their
diplomatic relationships with China to reduce the sentence to life imprisonment it was
useless. However, China is only one player in the game. It is ultimately up to the African
leadership to decide when and where to leverage its relationship with China to put its
citizens first. If African civil society believe that their leaders and their relationship with
China is only beneficial to the African governments, then it may cause more social
unrest, which is problematic for Chinese economic interests. The worry over China
becoming just another colonial power is yet to be realized because African leaders must
decide whether to help themselves or their people. Chinese investment and trade with
Africa has helped grow the economy of both continents. Hopefully the funds and
investment provided by China will ensure that African states have economic security and
provide these countries with a new found independence instead of reliance.
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Soft power with Chinese characteristics is a fitting term because China has
applied its own interpretation to a Western international relations theory. The fact that the
Chinese leadership discusses soft power openly and Chinese academics have written on
soft power discourse provides a glimpse that China cares about the way it is perceived in
the world. Legitimacy is crucial because for China to ensure domestic soft power it must
have strong soft power abroad. China’s emphasis on economic development is a part of
the PRC’s agenda that any political reform be slow and administered by the existing
regime. China is challenged to produce soft power because its authoritarian regime,
disregard for human rights at home, and its unwavering relationships with pariah states
ensure that the PRC are criticized by the western world.
For China, “soft power” is a perfect definition to describe their ambitions with the
world because their goal is to rise peacefully, which would imply they do not seek to
utilize hard power resources. Although there may be a gap between China’s cultural
values, domestic, and foreign policies it is too soon to tell whether Chinese soft power
explains its global rise. Future research should look more closely at the progress the
African Union makes as a political entity. Africa as a regional voting bloc can wield its
influence in the UNGA. As African states become more economically and politically
stable, expectations of their relationships with global powers may change. In addition,
whether an African civil society grows and becomes more wary of the Chinese presence
and how this affects the region politically. Furthermore, taking into consideration that
soft power builds and takes time to develop fully means that it is too soon to tell if
Chinese soft power has influenced voting affinity within the UNGA. Although China
claims it is a non-interventionist state this foreign policy may change as Chinese interests
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are threatened by terrorism in regions such as Sudan and Chad. However, due to the
focus on infrastructure development that China has invested in Africa maybe this will
provide more stability in the region. Soft power’s pillars of culture, domestic values, and
foreign policies are difficult to measure in the Chinese context because China itself is
changing. Domestic political and cultural tensions within China and whether the Chinese
economy can sustain its rapid economic development will play its part in foreign policies
and may change its soft power utility in the world.
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